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1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The SARS dispute resolution process was developed to ensure disputes are
resolved in a constitutional manner (i.e. fair, accountable and efficient). The aim of
this study was to investigate whether the dispute resolution process adheres to the
constitutional requirements as required in terms of section 195 of the Constitution.
The study summarised the rules of the dispute process in the various stages (i.e.
assessment / discovery stage, objection stage, appeal stage and the litigation
stage). The litigation stage was considered to be out of the scope for the study.
Using the summary, the significant processes were identified based on set criteria
for detailed analysis. The significant processes identified were:
· Prescribed form and manner, date of delivery and objection against an
assessment and extension of time periods
· Reasons for assessment
· Appeal against rejection of an objection
Each of the significant processes was analysed in detail by considering the
treatment of the processes in various cases in the courts.
2Based on the analysis, the following conclusions were reached on the significant
processes:
· Prescribed form and manner, objection against an assessment and
extension of time periods – This process was considered to be flawed since
the process does not provide for the SARS to be responsible for clerical or
processing errors. It was recommended that the taxpayer should not be bound
by the set timelines should the SARS issue an assessment which contains
clerical or processing errors. It was also noted that there are no set rules when
there is evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts
in the case and it was recommended that set rules be included in the rules and
the TAA to address the consequences, prescription period and processes
surrounding cases where fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material
facts is present.
· Reasons for assessment – The process was considered to be adequate,
however it was recommended that the process be improved by including a set
criteria for the SARS to comply with when providing reasons for an assessment
to the taxpayer.
· Appeal against rejection of an objection – The process was considered to be
adequate.
Based on the findings, the conclusion was drawn that the dispute resolution process
is considered to be adequate and constitutional with some reservations.
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4CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Chapter 9 of the Tax Administration Act1  (TAA) outlines the dispute resolution
provisions under which a taxpayer, who is aggrieved by an assessment raised by
the South African Revenue Service (SARS), may initiate a tax dispute against the
SARS. In order to supplement the provisions of Chapter 9 of the TAA the Minister
may, in terms of section 103 of the TAA, issue rules and procedures to facilitate and
govern the dispute resolution provisions as contained in the TAA.
On 11 July 2014 the Minister of Finance promulgated under section 103 of the TAA
the procedures to be followed when lodging an objection or appeal against an
assessment, procedures for alternative dispute resolution, the conduct and hearing
of appeals, application on notice before a tax court and various transitional rules2.
These procedures are generally referred to as “the SARS dispute process” or “the
rules”. Previously tax disputes were addressed in terms of section 107A of the
Income Tax Act3 (the Act). Section 107A of the Act was repealed when the TAA
came into effect.
Although there is generally a need for a proper dispute resolution process in any
transaction involving more than one party, the requirement for the SARS to have a
1 Act no 28 of 2001
2 Public Notice 550. Government Gazette 37819 of 11 July 2014
3 Act no 58 of 1962
5proper dispute resolution process is a requirement of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa4 (the Constitution).
Section 195 of the Constitution states the following:
‘Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles
enshrined in the Constitution.’
Section 195(1) specifically includes the following principles:
‘(a)   A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.
(b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted.
(c) Public administration must be development-oriented.
(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.
(e) People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to
participate in policy-making.
(f) Public administration must be accountable.
(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible
and accurate information.
(h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to
maximise human potential, must be cultivated.
(i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African
people, with employment and personnel management practices based on
ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past
to achieve broad representation.’
4Act no 108 of 1996
6In order for the SARS, a government entity, to govern its affairs in a democratic
manner as enshrined in the Constitution, a proper dispute resolution process has to
be in place.
This will ensure the following constitutional rights to which taxpayers are entitled,
amongst others, are not restricted:
· The taxpayer’s right to have services provided impartially, fairly, equitably and
without bias.5
· The taxpayer’s right to have the SARS be held accountable for incorrect
assessments or processes.6
· The taxpayer’s right to be provided with timely, accessible and accurate
information.7
1.1 The research problem and objective
Given the Constitutional requirement for the SARS to provide services to taxpayer’s
in a manner which is considered to be constitutional in terms of section 195 of the
Constitution, the dispute resolution process as contained in Chapter 9 of the TAA
and the rules as promulgated on section 103 of the TAA must embody those
constitutional requirements. It is submitted that this may not always be the case due
to the pressure government places on the SARS to collect tax revenues.
5 Section 195 (d) of The Constitution
6 Ibid section 195 (f)
7 Ibid section 195 (g)
7The objective of this treatise is to assess the SARS dispute resolution as contained
in Chapter 9 of the TAA and the rules as promulgated on section 103 of the TAA in
the light of the constitutional requirements and to identify any “flawed” rules or
processes.
A “flawed” rule or process is defined and limited for the purpose of this treatise to
the following:
· A rule or process treated differently in court to the rule’s intention.
· A rule or process that is significantly in favour of one of the parties.
· A rule or process which has the potential to be abused by either party to gain
an undue benefit.
The identification of “flawed’ rules or processes in the dispute resolution process
and rules lead to a conclusion, subject to the scoping limitations, on whether the
dispute resolution process and rules adhere to the constitutional requirements of
section 195 of the Constitution.
The interpretive research approach has been adopted as the treatise seeks to
describe and understand the rules and processes involved in the dispute resolution
process. The research is based purely on literature and case law and the conclusion
is based on the deductive reasoning following the arguments raised. All data used
is in the public domain and therefore there are no ethical considerations that arise.
81.2 Structure
In order to achieve the objective of the research project the following steps were
performed:
1.2.1 The dispute resolution process and rules
In chapter two the dispute resolution process and rules as promulgated under
section 103 of the TAA are summarised in a flow chart format. Each process and
rule was categorised in specified categories:
· Communication processes - Processes involving communication between the
taxpayer and the SARS;
· Submission processes - Processes governing submission of notices, disputes
and information;
· Appeal processes - Processes governing the steps to appeal against outcomes
of these rules or processes; and
· Other processes.
1.2.2 Significant processes and rules
In chapter three each of the processes and rules are assessed to determine if the
process is a significant process. For this purpose the following criteria were
considered:
· Number of times the process or rule was contested in the courts (cases both
subsequent and prior to the introduction of the TAA were considered since
9certain significant principles were confirmed in cases prior to the introduction of
the TAA and are still applicable on the some of the TAA provisions);
· A process or rule that is critical in the dispute resolution process (i.e. a process
that can have a significant effect on the outcome of the dispute); and
· Potential for abuse of the process or rule (i.e. a rule which can be interpreted in
a different way than intended or provide an unfair benefit to one of the parties to
the dispute).
1.2.3 Assessment and identification of flawed processes or rules
In chapter four each significant process is examined in detail to determine whether
the process or rule is adequate or “flawed”. This was achieved by assessing the
treatment of each significant process in the courts in order to conclude if the process
is operating effectively and as intended.
For processes or rules identified as having potential to be abused or to be
considerably favourable for one party, the potential impact on the process as a
whole has been determined in order to establish whether the abuse of the rule could
significantly compromise the dispute resolution process.
1.2.4 Conclusion
In chapter five, based on the results in point 1.2.3 above, conclusions are drawn,
subject to the scope limitation, on whether the dispute resolution process was either:
· Adequate (no contentious processes identified and the constitutional
requirements are met);
10
· Adequate with matters (the overall process can be considered to be adequate
and do not compromise the taxpayers rights in terms of the Constitution,
however some contentious processes was identified);
· Flawed (multiple contentious processes identified, which have the potential to
compromise the outcome of the dispute. The contentious processes could be
considered to be unconstitutional processes); or
· Significantly flawed (numerous contentious processes was identified and will
most-likely compromise the outcome of the dispute. The whole dispute process
is thus considered to be unconstitutional).
1.3 Scope of the research
The research project has been limited to the dispute resolution processes in terms
of Chapter 9 of the TAA and the requirements of section 195 of the Constitution. A
comparative study between the South African dispute resolution process and other
jurisdictions was not be performed. Further for the purpose of the research, the
litigation stage was not considered (refer to chapter two as to what is considered to
be part of the litigation stage).
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CHAPTER 2 - THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS AND RULES
The dispute process consists mainly of four stages namely the assessment /
discovery stage, objection stage, appeal stage and finally the litigation stage. In this
chapter each stage is summarised and the rules applicable to each of these stages
are determined which are then be used to determine the significant process in
chapter three.8
2.1 Assessment / discovery stage
During this stage the SARS issue an assessment to the taxpayer. The
taxpayer may request the SARS to provide reasons for raising the
assessment.
8 Chart 1 to 4: Adapted charts from the South African Revenue Service Dispute Resolution Guide as issued on
28 October 2014
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The rules applicable to this stage are:
Rule 2: Prescribed form and manner and date of delivery
(Communication).
Rule 2 governs the manner in which the delivery of
assessments, objections and requests are conducted between
the SARS and the taxpayer.
Rule 4: Extension of time periods (Communication)
Rule 4 prescribes the manner in which the taxpayer may
request for extension when required to deliver information to
the SARS, objecting to an assessment, appealing against a
disallowed objection or any other request to present or deliver
information to the SARS in terms of the TAA.
Rule 6: Reasons for assessment (Communication and Submission)
Rule 6 allows the taxpayer to request reasons for any
assessment raised by the SARS. The rule also prescribes the
manner in which reasons should be requested as well as the
timelines in which the request should be made by the taxpayer
as well as actioned by the SARS.
13
2.2 Objection stage
During this stage the taxpayer may decide to lodge an objection on any
assessment raised by the SARS.
The rules applicable to this stage are:
Rule 2: Prescribed form and manner and date of delivery (Refer to 2.1)
Rule 4: Extension of time periods (Refer to 2.1)
Rule 7: Objection against assessment (Submission)
Rule 7 prescribes the manner and period in which the taxpayer
may object to an assessment raised by the SARS in terms of
section 104 of the TAA.
Rule 8: Request for substantiating documents after objection lodged
(Communication and submission)
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Rule 8 prescribes the manner and period in which the SARS
may request additional information relating to an objection
made by the taxpayer.
Rule 9: Decision on objection (Communication)
Rule 9 prescribes the period in which the SARS have to
respond to an objection made by the taxpayer. The SARS have
to either allow or disallow the objection as required in terms of
section 106 of the TAA.
2.3 Appeal stage
During this stage, the taxpayer may decide to appeal to the tax board or tax
court against an objection disallowed by the SARS. During the appeal, the
taxpayer may indicate whether the taxpayer is willing to participate in an
alternative dispute resolution process.
15
Rules applicable to this stage are:
Rule 10 and 11: Appeal against assessment (Appeal and submission)
Rule 10 and 11 allows the taxpayer to appeal against an
objection disallowed by the SARS to the tax board or tax court
in terms of section 107 of the TAA. The rule also prescribes the
manner and period in which the taxpayer has to appeal against
the decision.
2.4  Litigation stage
During this stage the case will be resolved through the alternative dispute
resolution process (“ADR”) or presented before either the tax board or tax
court. Should the taxpayer not be satisfied with the tax board decision, the
taxpayer may then proceed to the tax court. Should the taxpayer not be
satisfied by the tax court decision, the taxpayer may appeal to the higher
courts.
16
2.5 Rules applicable to all stages
Rule 50 to rule 64: Applications on notice
Rules 50 to 64 contain various provisions which flow into the
above rules.
To conclude, the four stages in the dispute process as well as the rules applicable
to each of these stages have been identified. In the following chapter, using this
summary of the rules, the significant processes are determined for further analysis.
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CHAPTER 3 - SIGNIFICANT PROCESSES AND RULES
In this chapter the significant processes are identified using set criteria. These
significant processes are analysed in detail in chapter four to determine whether
these significant processes are flawed which could ultimately lead to the conclusion
that the entire dispute process is flawed.
To determine whether a process is significant, the following criteria are considered:
· Number of times the rule or process was contested in the courts.
· A process that is critical in the dispute resolution process (i.e. a process that
can have a significant effect on the outcome of the dispute);
· Potential for abuse of the process or rule. Processes with potential for abuse
are considered to be processes where the one party enjoys an unfair benefit,
the process can be used in order to unnecessarily delay the process or the
process can be used either party to be taxed incorrectly.
To summarise the rules of the dispute process as identified in the previous chapter:
Part A: General provisions: Rules 1 to 5 of which rules 2
(Prescribed form and manner and date of delivery) and
4 (Extension of time periods) are critical. Refer to point
3.1 and 3.2 below)
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Part B: Reasons for assessment, objection, appeal and
test cases: Rules 6 – 12 in which rules 6 (Reasons for
assessment), 7 (Objection against assessment),
8 (Request for substantiating documents after objection
lodged), 9 (Decision on objection) and 10 (Appeal
against assessment) are critical (Refer to 3.1, 3.3 and
3.4 below).  Rules 11 (Appeal to tax board or tax court)
and 12 (Test cases) are outside the scope of this
treatise.
Part C, D, E, F and G: These rules are either outside of the scope of the treatise
or procedural in nature and therefore are not, it is
submitted, critically contentious.
3.1 Prescribed form and manner and objection against an assessment
Rule 2, 7, 8 and 9 and section 104 of the TAA includes the following significant
principles and processes:
· Lodging of an objection in a the prescribed form and manner9;
· Lodging an objection within 30 days of assessment10; and
· Prescription period of three years for returns.11
9 Rule 2
10 Rule 7
11 Rule 7 read with section 104(5) of the TAA
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It is submitted that this is a critical process in terms of the criteria mentioned above
since rule 7 and section 104 of the TAA are one of the most important steps in the
dispute process as these rules are the start of the dispute process and include the
period which a taxpayers has to object or the SARS has to raise a revised
assessment. These principles were contested in the courts in numerous cases.
Contested in the courts
The concept of exceptional circumstances and prescription of returns have been
contested in courts on numerous occasions. Cases relating to raising assessments
or objecting to assessments after the prescribed period:
· ITC 1665 (61 SATC 413) (1998) – Requirements to comply with the prescription
rules (i.e. delivery and date of assessment).
· ITC 1671 (62 SATC 39) (1999) – An assessment raised in terms of the practice
prevailing at the time will be considered a valid assessment and the prescription
rules will apply to that assessment.
· ITC 1730 (64 SATC 391) (2001) – Prescription when there is fraud,
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts.
· ITC 1795 (67 SATC 297) (2005) – Failure to provide adequate reasons for late
submission and thus the assessment prescribed.
· CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd (69 SATC 205) (2007)12 – The
principle of finality of assessments (i.e. the requirement for assessments to
become final in terms of the requirements of the Act).
12 (6) SA 601 (SCA)
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· ITC 1855 (74 SATC 58) (2010) – The meaning of what is an assessment in order
to determine if the assessment have prescribed.
Potential for abuse
It is submitted that the three year prescription rule can be used by the SARS to delay
the process of verifying returns. The TAA allows for the SARS to conduct a
verification or audit any time during this three year period for a period as long as the
SARS deems to be appropriate13. Although there are timeframes in which the SARS
should conduct an audit and requirements for the SARS to meet during this
verification / audit (i.e. keeping the taxpayer informed14), the consequences for the
SARS not adhering to these requirements are not nearly as harsh as the
consequences for the taxpayer not objecting within the 30 days’ time limit or not
notifying the SARS of an intention to object when required to. It is submitted that
with no serious consequences for the SARS, there is potential for the SARS to
abuse the provision.
The objection process also does not allow for extended periods when a clerical or
system processing error was made by the SARS. No obligation is placed on the
SARS to ensure the assessment was actually raised in the correct manner.
13 Section 40 of the TAA read with section 99 of the TAA
14 Section 42 of the TAA
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Section 92 of the TAA states:
‘If at any time SARS is satisfied that an assessment does not reflect the correct
application of a tax Act to the prejudice of SARS or the fiscus, SARS must make an
additional assessment to correct the prejudice.’
The only obligation placed by the TAA on the SARS is to ensure that the Act was
applied correctly.
This section also only requires that the SARS consider any prejudice towards the
SARS or the fiscus and not any prejudice towards the taxpayer as a result of the
assessment raised by the SARS (i.e. The SARS is not required to consider the
whether the change in the assessment will result in different applications of other
parts of the taxpayer’s tax submission). The taxpayer may still object to the
additional assessment, however it will place an additional burden on the taxpayer.
Conclusion
Based on the multiple times contested in the courts, the critical nature of the process
and the potential for abuse, this process is considered to be a significant process
and is investigated further in chapter four.
3.2 Extension of time periods
Rule 4 and section 104 of the TAA include the concept of “exceptional
circumstances” and providing reasonable grounds for extension of the time period.
It is submitted that this is a critical process in terms of the criteria mentioned above
since objections are generally of a technical nature and there are various
22
requirements for the taxpayer to comply with when raising objections in the
prescribed form and manner. This provision is thus often used by the taxpayer to
produce an accurate and valid submission to the SARS or by the SARS to respond
in the required manner to taxpayers when requiring to respond on a request made
by the taxpayer (i.e. request for reasons, allowing or disallowing an objection to an
assessment).
Contested in the courts
· S Company v CSARS (IT0122/2017) [2017] ZATC 2 – Extension of time periods
by the SARS.
Potential for abuse
Generally exceptional circumstances is subject to the Commissioner’s discretion
(i.e. a senior SARS official has to be satisfied that there are exceptional
circumstances present which caused the late submission or objection 15 ). The
prospect of proving exceptional circumstances can deter a taxpayer with valid
reasons from objecting to an assessment incorrectly raised by the SARS should the
taxpayer only discover the error in assessment after the required 30 day period.
It is submitted that these provisions could potentially be used by the SARS to avoid
taking responsibility for processing or clerical errors made by the SARS when
issuing revised assessments.
15 Section 104(5)(a) of the TAA
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There are no provisions distinguishing a processing error (i.e. the e-filing system not
using the correct rate as prescribed in terms of the Act when assessing a return)
from a technical error (i.e. the interpretation of the Act).
Conclusion
Based on the importance and regular use of this process in the dispute process and
the potential for abuse, this process is considered to be a significant process and is
investigated further in chapter four.
3.3 Reasons for assessment
Rule 6 prescribes the form and manner in which a taxpayer may request reasons
for an assessment raised by the SARS.
It is submitted that this is a critical process in terms of the criteria mentioned above
since a taxpayer, when objecting to an assessment, is required to provide adequate
and detailed grounds for objection. These grounds for objection cannot be changed
(i.e. introduction of new grounds for objection16) later in the objection or appeal
process. Given this requirement to furnish adequate, accurate and complete
grounds for objection, the taxpayer generally will request reasons in order to
formulate a proper objection to the assessment raised by the SARS.
Contested in the courts
· ITC 1811 (68 SATC 193) – Furnishing adequate reasons by the SARS.
16 Rule 10(3)
24
· CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117 CC trading as Global Investment (73 SATC
114)17 – Furnishing of adequate reasons by the SARS.
Potential for abuse
Provision of incorrect, inadequate or vague reasons could result in the entire
process being delayed. Furthermore should the reasons provided not be adequate,
then the taxpayer could provide the incorrect grounds for objection when objecting
to an assessment or even not object to an assessment where there were, in fact,
justifiable reasons to object.
Conclusion
Based on the regular use of this process and the potential for abuse, this process is
considered to be a significant process and is investigated further in chapter four.
3.4 Appeal against rejection of an objection
Rule 10 prescribes the form and manner in which a taxpayer may appeal against
objection which was disallowed by the SARS.
It is submitted that this is a critical process in terms of the criteria mentioned above
since the process allows the taxpayer to contest an objection disallowed by the
SARS. Given that the objection will be considered solely by the SARS and not in a
court of law during the objection phase, the TAA allows for a taxpayer to appeal
against a decision made by the SARS to disallow an objection.
17 2011 (4) SA 551 (SCA)
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This process also allows the taxpayer to present further evidence to support the
objection, however this process also contains the concept of introducing new
grounds for objection and the limitation there of.
Contested in the courts
· Computek (Pty) Ltd v CSARS (75 SATC 104)18 – Changing / new grounds for
objection during appeal.
· ITC 1843 (72 SATC 229) – Changing grounds of assessment.
Potential for abuse
It is submitted that the appeal process can be used as a method to delay the dispute
process even longer and potentially deter taxpayers from taking a dispute further
even though the taxpayer may have a legitimate reason to object (i.e. the SARS
disallowing an objection without properly considering the grounds for objection or to
only meet a procedural requirement in terms of the TAA). Further this rule also
contains the principle that a taxpayer may not introduce new grounds for objection19.
Although it is required that the taxpayer submit an accurate and complete objection
it could result in the taxpayer being incorrectly taxed as a result of a procedural
requirement.
18 2012 (830/2011) ZASCA 178
19 Rule 10(3)
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Conclusion
Based on the critical nature of the process as identified above and the potential for
abuse, this process is considered to be a significant process and is investigated
further in chapter four.
Overall conclusion
The various significant processes in the dispute resolution process were identified
to be:
· Prescribed form and manner, objection against an assessment and extension of
time periods (rules 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9)
· Reasons for assessment (rule 6)
· Appeal against rejection of an objection (rule 10)
These significant process are further investigated in chapter four in order to
determine the adequacy of the process in the light of the Constitution and its
requirements.
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CHAPTER 4 - ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT PROCESSES AND RULES
In the previous chapter, three processes were identified as significant processes.
The processes are:
· Prescribed form and manner and objection against an assessment and
extension of time periods
· Reasons for assessment
· Appeal against rejection of an objection
In this chapter these process are assessed in detail to determine whether the
process or rule is “adequate” or “flawed” based on the constitutional requirements
of section 195 of the Constitution, being
· The taxpayer’s right to have services provided impartially, fairly, equitably and
without bias.20
· The taxpayer’s right to have the SARS be held accountable for incorrect
assessments or processes.21
· The taxpayer’s right to be provided with timely, accessible and accurate
information.22
20 Section 195 (d) of The Constitution
21 Ibid section 195 (f)
22 Ibid section 195 (g)
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4.1 Lodging an objection within 30 days of assessment in the prescribed
from and the concept of “exceptional circumstances” when requesting
extension of submission periods
Rule 7(1) requires that a taxpayer who is aggrieved by an assessment raised by the
SARS must deliver a notice of objection to the SARS within 30 days from the date
of assessment or the date on which the SARS provided reasons in terms of rule
6(4).
These timeframes may be extended in terms of rule 4 and section 104 of the TAA.
Section 104(4) of the TAA states that:
‘A senior SARS official may extend the period prescribed in the ‘rules’ within which
objections must be made if satisfied that reasonable grounds exist for the delay in
lodging the objection.’
(Emphasis added)
Section 104(5)(a) further states that:
‘The period for objection must not be so extended—
(a) for a period exceeding 21 business days, unless a senior SARS official is
satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist which gave rise to the delay in
lodging the objection;
(b)  if more than three years have lapsed from the date of assessment or the
‘decision’; or
29
(c)  if the grounds for objection are based wholly or mainly on a change in a
practice generally prevailing which applied on the date of assessment or the
‘decision’.’
(Emphasis added)
Thus to summarise, section 104(4) read with section 104(5) of the TAA limits the
application of section 104(4) to a further 21 days if the taxpayer can provide
reasonable grounds for the delay in objecting to an assessment.
For a longer period, the taxpayer will be required to show that the reason for the
delay is due to exceptional circumstances. It thus requires the taxpayer to present
more than just reasonable grounds for the delay in submitting an objection to an
assessment. This brings it back to the question of what is “exceptional
circumstances”.
4.2.1 Exceptional circumstances
The term “exceptional circumstances” is not defined in the TAA or in the rules, thus
the treatment in the court was considered to determine if a definition for exception
circumstances can be made.
Mpati P23 referred to the summary made by Thring J on what is considered to be
exceptional circumstances:
‘1. What is ordinarily contemplated by the words ‘exceptional circumstances’ is
something out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature; something which is
23Avnit v First Rand Bank Ltd (20233/14) [2014] ZASCA 132 (23 September 2014) at para [5]
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excepted in the sense that the general rule does not apply to it; something
uncommon, rare or different: ‘besonder’, ‘seldsaam’, ‘uitsonderlik’, or ‘in hoë
mate ongewoon’.
2. To be exceptional the circumstances concerned must arise out of, or be
incidental to, the particular case.
3. Whether or not exceptional circumstances exist is not a decision which
depends upon the exercise of a judicial discretion: their existence or
otherwise is a matter of fact which the Court must decide accordingly.
4. Depending on the context in which it is used, the word ‘exceptional’ has two
shades of meaning: the primary meaning is unusual or different: the
secondary meaning is markedly unusual or specially different.
5. Where, in a statute, it is directed that a fixed rule shall be departed from only
under exceptional circumstances, effect will, generally speaking, best be
given to the intention of the Legislature by applying a strict rather than  a
liberal meaning to the phrase, and by carefully examining any circumstances
relied on as allegedly being exceptional.’
(Emphasis added)
It is submitted that the above summary defines exceptional circumstances in the
broader use of the term (i.e. not specifically to section 104(5)(a) of the TAA) and
based on the above, it is submitted that there are three requirements that have to
be met:
· There must have been an unusual or not of the ordinary event;
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· The event has to be specific to the case; and
· The event prevents the application of a set rule.
"Unusual or not of the ordinary event"
Unusual is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘not habitually or commonly occurring
or done’. 24  Further synonyms for the word unusual are uncommon, atypical,
unexpected, surprising, unfamiliar, unwonted or different.
Thus for an event to be unusual, it must be the opposite of the ordinary or normal
course. The question then arises as to when an event becomes an unusual event
(i.e. when does an event cease to be ordinary)?
It is thus submitted that an event becomes unusual when the event has an
unintended direct influence on the process or rule, which results in the process or
rule not operating as intended by the rule or process maker.25
"The event has to be specific to the case"
It is important that the unusual event has to be linked to the case. An unusual event
may have occurred, but if the unusual event is not directly linked to the case or has
a bearing on the case, then these circumstances cannot be considered to be the
reason for preventing adherence to a rule.
24 Website: Oxford Living Dictionaries (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/unusual) accessed on 3
December 2017.
25 Based on Thring J judgement in MV Ais Mamas Seatrans Maritime v Owners, MV Ais Mamas , and another
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When looking specifically at exceptional circumstances in terms of section
104(5)(a), then the event will generally be specific to the case (i.e. there will be a
link between the event and the reason for not lodging the objection in terms of the
required time lines).
"The event prevented application of a set rule"
The event has to be the reason why the rule or law was not applied. So for example,
if the case in question is considerably complex and required extensive expert
consultation and data mining which took a long period to complete. The consultation
and data mining was however completed before the required submission date, but
the notice of objection was only filed after the date due to the taxpayer not being
able to deliver the notice to the receiver in time, then the taxpayer cannot use the
complex nature and long period required to perform the consultation and data
mining as an exceptional circumstances for late lodgement of the objection since
the long time it took for the consultation to be completed was not the reason for late
lodging of the objection. The reasons directly linked to the late delivery should be
considered for exceptional circumstances (i.e. why the taxpayer only delivered the
notice of objection after the due date even though the objection was completed
before the due date).
Given the above, it is submitted that a definition for exceptional circumstances in
terms of section 104(5) of the TAA is an unusual or not of the ordinary event, out of
the taxpayer’s control, which resulted in the taxpayer being unable to comply with
the period requirements as set down in section 104 of the TAA.
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Given the above submitted definition, the TAA does however provide an indication
on certain exceptional circumstances where the SARS have to remit a penalty
imposed. These exceptional circumstances are contained in section 218(2) of the
TAA which states that the SARS must remit a penalty or part of a penalty if one or
more of the following circumstances are present:
‘(a)  a natural or human-made disaster;
(b)  a civil disturbance or disruption in services;
(c)  a serious illness or accident;
(d)  serious emotional or mental distress;
(e)  any of the following acts by SARS:
(i) a capturing error;
(ii)  a processing delay;
(iii)  provision of incorrect information in an official publication or media
release issued by the Commissioner;
(iv)  delay in providing information to any person; or
(v)  failure by SARS to provide sufficient time for an adequate response
to a request for information by SARS;
(f) serious financial hardship, such as—
(i) in the case of an individual, lack of basic living requirements; or
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(ii)  in the case of a business, an immediate danger that the continuity of
business operations and the continued employment of its employees
are jeopardised; or
(g)  any other circumstance of analogous seriousness.’
Although these examples of what is considered to be exceptional circumstances are
included in the TAA, they only apply to when a penalty is required to be remitted
and not for an extension for objecting to an assessment. The SARS may thus use
the above as a guideline, however is not bound to condone the extension should
any of the above be present in the case.
4.2.2 Is the process considered to be flawed?
The intention of including the provision which allows an opportunity for the taxpayer
to object to an assessment even though the period allowed for objection has lapsed,
is to allow for unforeseen events preventing the taxpayer from objecting to an
assessment within the required period. The provision is thus crucial to enable the
taxpayer to exercise his/her right to object and ultimately allows the taxpayer to
enjoy his/her right to receive a services from the SARS which is fair and without bias
as required in terms of the Constitution. However when considering the requirement
that there have to be exceptional circumstances, it severely limits the application of
the provision.
To illustrate how proving exceptional circumstances can limit the application of the
process, consider the following example:
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· An audit was performed on a taxpayer’s 2014 personal income tax return which
was filed on 30 October 2015.
· The audit was concluded on 30 November 2017 and a valid additional
assessment was raised on the 2014 year of assessment. The additional
assessment ring-fenced losses relating to a trade in terms of section 20A of
the Act.
· The taxpayer declared profits from this trade during the 2015 year of
assessment and was taxed on these profits in the 2015 year of assessment.
This return was filed and assessed on 30 September 2016.
· When issuing the additional assessment to the 2014 year of assessment, the
SARS did not issue a revised assessment to the 2015 year of assessment in
order to roll forward the ring fenced losses.
Using the above facts, the following two scenarios could arise:
Scenario 1: The taxpayer noticed that the SARS had not raised a revised
assessment to the 2015 year of assessment and filed a notice of objection to the
2015 assessment within 30 days after the 2014 additional assessment was
received.
Outcome assessed against section 104 of the TAA:
Section 104(4): The taxpayer should be able to show reasonable grounds which is
required in terms of section 104(4) of the TAA since an error was made by the SARS
and the Act allows for the ring-fenced losses to be deducted when profits are earned
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from that trade in a subsequent year of assessment. The extension period thus has
to be considered against section 104(5) of the TAA.
Section 104(5) provides that the period for objection may only be extended by more
than 21 days if the taxpayer proves to a SARS official that exceptional
circumstances were the reason for not objecting within the required timeframe
(30 business days from the date of the 2015 assessment).
When comparing the above scenario to the submitted definition (refer to 4.2.1) for
exceptional circumstances, the taxpayer should be able to prove exceptional
circumstances as follows:
An unusual or not of the ordinary event: It was expected that the SARS will
correct subsequent assessments for the effects of an additional assessment raised
to a previous period. Since the SARS did not do so, it can be considered to be a
"not of the ordinary" event.
…which resulted in the taxpayer being unable to comply with the period
requirements as set down in section 104 of the TAA: The taxpayer only became
aware of the ring fenced losses once the additional assessment was raised.
Therefore the event made it impossible for the taxpayer to have been able to object
within the required timeframes based on the date the 2015 return was assessed.
Given that both parts of the submitted definition were met, the taxpayer should
succeed to prove exceptional circumstances.
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Now to consider scenario 2.
Scenario 2: Using the same facts as per the above with the exception that the
taxpayer only filed the notice of objection to the 2015 assessment after the period
of 30 days have passed from receiving the additional assessment to the 2014 year
of assessment.
When now considering the scenario against the submitted definition of exceptional
circumstances, the taxpayer will most like fail.
An unusual or not of the ordinary event: Again it was expected that the SARS
will correct subsequent assessments for the effects of an additional assessment
raised to a previous period. Since the SARS did not do so, it can be considered to
be a "not of the ordinary" event.
…which resulted in the taxpayer being unable to comply with the period
requirements as set down in section 104 of the TAA: It is here where the
taxpayer will fail in his argument. The taxpayer received the revised assessment to
the 2014 year of assessment. The event as per the above did not prohibit the timely
filing of an objection to the revised assessment (i.e. 30 days after the taxpayer was
notified of the revised assessment to the 2014 year of assessment).
Two different results even though the underlying cause for the objection is that the
SARS made a processing error (i.e. the error is not as a result of a different
interpretation of the law, but due to the SARS raising the assessment in the incorrect
manner).
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Although the taxpayer is responsible for his/her tax affairs and to monitor those
affairs, the SARS should also be responsible to implement changes to a taxpayer’s
assessments correctly.
It is thus submitted that the concept of proving exceptional circumstances to extend
the period for lodging objections is favourable to the SARS, since the provisions do
not require the SARS to prove that an additional assessment was raised in an
accurate manner based on the information available to the SARS (i.e. this could
allow the SARS to hide behind this provision without any accountability for a
processing or clerical error made by the SARS and result in the taxpayer being taxed
unfairly).
Extension of time periods by the SARS
The extension of time periods was considered from the taxpayer’s position above
(i.e. requiring to prove exceptional circumstances), however there are numerous
provisions available for the SARS to extend the period for responding to a request
made by the taxpayer:
Rule 6(4) to rule 6(7) states that:
‘…(4) Where a SARS official is satisfied that the reasons required to enable the
taxpayer to formulate an objection have been provided, SARS must, within 30 days
after delivery of the request, notify the taxpayer accordingly which notice must refer
to the documents wherein the reasons were provided.
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(5) Where in the opinion of a SARS official the reasons required to enable the
taxpayer to formulate an objection have not been provided, SARS must provide the
reasons within 45 days after delivery of the request for reasons.
(6) The period for providing the reasons may be extended by SARS if a SARS official
is satisfied that more time is required by SARS to provide reasons due to exceptional
circumstances, the complexity of the matter or the principle or the amount involved.
(7) An extension may not exceed 45 days and SARS must deliver a notice of the
extension to the taxpayer before expiry of the 45 day period referred to in sub-rule
(5).’
(Emphasis added)
The SARS, when considering rule 6, have up to a total of 90 days to respond to the
request for providing reasons. The SARS further do not have a requirement to
provide reasons for extending the period for an additional 45 days in terms of rule
6(7) (i.e. the rule only requires the SARS to notify the taxpayer of the extension not
to provide reasons why an extension is needed). Finally the criteria for the SARS to
notify the taxpayer that the SARS requires an extension is severely open to
interpretation by the SARS official. Rule 6(6) requires that there have to be
exceptional circumstances present or that the matter complex or the amount
involved is significant. These requirements are not defined in the rules nor the TAA
and thus is open to interpretation by the SARS only.
These provisions thus allow, without any consequences, for the SARS to
unnecessarily delay the dispute process which could result in a financial impact on
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the taxpayer (i.e. the SARS may enforce the pay now, argue later principle or
withhold refunds due to the taxpayer).
Although it is submitted that the above rules are favourable to the SARS, these rules
are still binding on the SARS and can result in rulings against the SARS, as was the
case in S Company v CSARS26.
Summary of background facts in this case
· In this case the SARS issued assessments relating to the taxpayer’s 2005 to
2012 years of assessments.
· The taxpayer requested reasons for raising of the assessments and the SARS
responded to the request.27
· The taxpayer was not satisfied that adequate reasons were provided and the
taxpayer subsequently brought an application in terms of rule 6(1) to compel
the SARS to provide “adequate” reasons in order to enable to the taxpayer to
formulate an objection to these assessments. as well as to provide reasons
why the SARS withdrew an earlier decision contained in a letter dated
4 May 2007 which impacted directly on certain aspects of the assessments.
The application was dismissed in the tax court.
26(IT0122/2017) [2017] ZATC 2
27 Judgement of Cloete J dated 17 October 2017 (“Cloete judgement”) in S Company v CSARS (IT0122/2017)
[2017] ZATC 2 at para [3]
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· The taxpayer then filed its notice of appeal in terms of section 107(1) of the
TAA. In terms of rule 31 the SARS is required to deliver its statement of
grounds of assessment and opposing appeal within 45 days thereafter.28
· The 45 days expired and the SARS did not comply with the rule 31
requirements. After the expiration of the 45 days, a SARS official met with the
taxpayer in order to request extension of a further 45 days in terms of the rule
4. It should be noted that the SARS had not complied with rule 4(2) which
states that:
‘(2) A request for an extension must be delivered to the other party before
expiry of the period prescribed under these rules unless the parties agree
that the request may be delivered after expiry of the period.’
· The taxpayer however agreed to the extension and during this period the
taxpayer made a ‘without prejudice’ settlement proposal to the SARS.
· The SARS official prior to expiry of the extended 45 period advised the
taxpayer that the rule 31 statements would not be provided by the due date as
he was attending to the settlement proposal and requested an additional
extension. The taxpayer reluctantly agreed to a final extension of 30 days.
· SARS again did not comply with the deadline as set. The taxpayer then notified
the SARS that they will apply to the Tax Court for a final order in terms of
28 Cloete judgement at para [5]
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section 129(2) of the TAA (i.e. proceed with the case regardless whether the
rule 31 statement was received).29
Accordingly the taxpayer contended the following (in relation to the dispute
resolution process):
1. Whether the taxpayer is entitled to the exemption previously granted to it in terms
of s 10(1)(zl) of the Act and specifically why the allowances previously granted
in terms of the letter dated 4 May 2007 were disallowed;
2. That the assessments had prescribed as these assessments were issued long
after the prescription period.30
The taxpayer, in its appeal, made reference to two judgements:
1. The previous SCA judgement in relation to the 2002 to 2004 years of
assessment where the letter as referred to above was first discussed.31 In this
case the SARS, prior to the assessments prescribing, issued a letter to the
taxpayer which was headed 'INCOME TAX: REVISED ASSESSMENTS FOR
THE YEARS OF ASSESSMENT 2001 TO 2004'. In the letter the SARS
responded to questions raised by the taxpayer in the objection, provided a
calculation of the section 10(1)(zl) exemption as well as indicated the revised
losses for the years in question. The letter indicated that the revised
assessments would be issued in due course. The SARS did not issue the
revised assessments and later contested that the letter did not constitute an
29 Cloete judgement at para [6] to [9] and [13] to [14]
30 Cloete judgement at para [48]
31 CSARS v South African Custodial Services (Pty) Ltd (2012 (1) SA 522 (SCA)) 74 SATC 61
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assessment. The courts disagreed and confirmed the letter constituted an
assessment. Refer to the discussion on ITC 1855 in 4.3 below.
2. The second case addressed by the taxpayer was the point made by Henney J
in a previous tax court case between the parties (Tax court number 0004/2016)
(the Henney judgement) 32 .  In the letter above, the SARS included the
calculation for the section 10(1)(zl) exemption. The SARS contended that the
calculation only related to the 2001 to 2004 years of assessments (i.e. the
years to which the letter relate), however in the letter the SARS have provided
a full calculation from 2002 to 2019. Nowhere in the letter did it state that the
letter only referred to 2001 to 2004. Henney J stated the following on the
matter:
‘Clearly from this assessment the Applicant was informed in what respects it
would be liable to pay tax after the exemption had been taken into
consideration. It was clearly a calculation which determined what amount of
tax would be payable by the Applicant and not merely a notice or a decision
taken by the commissioner for the purposes of section 9(1) of the TAA to find
application.’33
Henney J thus concluded that the amounts relating to the future years also
constitutes assessments and the manner in which the exemption may be
claimed in future years.
32 Citation by Cloete J in the Cloete judgement to the judgment of Henney J dated 3 June 2016 (‘the Henney
judgment’) under Tax Court number 0004/2016
33 Ibid at para 40
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The SARS on the other hand contested that they had reasonable prospects of
success in the case and thus requested that the court to condone raising of the
assessments after the prescription period.
These prospects of success were the following:
· The section 10(1)(zl) exemption is not applicable to the case; and
· The amounts previously granted to the taxpayer as an 11(g) allowance is
considered to be a recoupment in terms of section 8(4) of the Act since some
of the amounts were subsequently reimbursed by the Department to the
taxpayer.
The SARS however did not contest or consider the SCA or the Henney judgements
in their case.
The court held in favour of the taxpayer allowing the final order in terms of section
129(2) of the TAA where the court may order a decision to be altered, for the
following reasons:
1. The SARS had shown gross neglect for the dispute process rules.34
2. Given that the SARS had not addressed the matters confirmed in the SCA and
Henney judgements, the SARS had not convinced the judge that they had
proper prospects of success. Thus the application for condonation for late
raising of an assessment failed.35
34 Cloete judgement at para [41]
35 Cloete judgement at para [54]
45
3. As a result, the assessments raised by the SARS were to be reversed.
The S Company case clearly shows how the extension of period rules can be
abused which resulted in unnecessary delays.
Further, the rules are still favourable to the SARS, since the main reason for failing
the appeal is due to the SARS not being able to prove prospects for success. Had
the SARS been able address the SCA and the Henny Judgements in their defence,
then the judgement could have been in the favour of the SARS regardless of delays
and gross disregard for procedural requirements by the SARS.
This case also raises the question of the level of consideration that the SARS went
into when the SARS came to the decision to raise the assessments. The SARS
should have performed the bulk of the research and application of the Act to the
facts prior to raising the revised assessments and not only after the taxpayer
requested reasons for raising the assessment.
It is submitted that, based on the issue identified in the discussion on exceptional
circumstances and the potential abuse of the extension of time periods above, these
provisions are flawed. It is recommended that the provisions be amended as follows:
Requesting condonation for lodging and objection: Include a provision that
requires the assessments raised by the SARS to meet specific requirements for
example:
· The change was accurately processed and free of clerical / system errors.
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· Should other years of assessment be impacted by the change, then those years
should have been accurately amended when raising the assessment.
Should any of the above be present, then the taxpayer should not be required to
show exceptional circumstances for any delay in objecting to the assessment. It is
submitted as well that the above should still be subject to the three year prescription
rule in order to obtain finality in assessments (Refer to 4.3 below).
Extension of period to respond to taxpayers by the SARS: Include a provision
where if the taxpayer proves a lack of procedural accuracy, the SARS will be liable
to reimburse the taxpayer for any costs associated with the delay or lack of
procedural accuracy.
Alternatively, where gross neglect for the procedural requirements is present, then
a default judgement will be granted regardless of prospects of success.
It is submitted that although this alternative recommendation may result in a
taxpayer potentially being under-taxed, the recommendation may ultimately result
in the full process being fair. It is submitted that the rules are particularly harsh
towards the taxpayer should the procedural requirements not be met by the taxpayer
and introduction of this recommendation should result in the SARS facing similar
consequences for not adhering to the procedural requirements.
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4.2 Prescription period of three years for returns
As stated above, the period for objection may not be extended if more than three
have lapsed from the date of assessment.36
For the SARS however section 99 of the TAA provides additional considerations
with regard to the prescription period for assessments. To summarise section 99 of
the TAA:
· Original assessment – Three years after the date of the original assessment
(section 99(1)(a)).
· Self-assessment for which a return is required – Five years after the date of
the self-assessment original assessment (Section 99(1)(b)).
· Self-assessment for which no return is required – Five years after the date
the last payment for the tax period was received or the effective date for the tax
period (Section 99(1)(c)).
· Additional assessment, reduced assessments, a tax for which no return is
required, resolved dispute – No assessment may be raised on an additional
assessment if the amount which should have been taxed under the preceding
assessment was, in accordance with the practice generally prevailing at the date
of assessment, not assessed to tax (Section 99(1)(d)(i)).
The above period requirements however do not apply in the following instances:
36 Rule 7 read with section 104 of the TAA
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· In the case of an assessment or self-assessment if the full amount of tax
chargeable was not assessed due to fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure
of material facts.
· If the SARS and the taxpayer agree prior to the expiry of the above limitations.
· If required to raise the assessment due to an outcome in the dispute resolution
process or in terms of a court judgement.
Effectively based on the section 99 and 104 of the TAA the prescription periods are
as follow:
Taxpayer – No objection may not be lodged three years after the date of
assessment.
SARS – No assessment may be raised three years after the date of assessment,
provided the amount not taxed in the original assessment was not due to fraud,
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts.
The prescription rules were discussed in the courts on numerous occasions. The
facts and outcomes relating specifically to the prescription rules for each case have
been considered below:
ITC 1665 (61 SATC 413) (1998)
Summary of background facts relating specifically to prescription
· The SARS issued an additional assessment on the last day before the
assessment was due to expire.
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· The taxpayer contended that the assessment was never received prior to the
prescription date as required in terms of the prescription rules (i.e. the
assessment has to be raised and delivered prior to the prescription date).37
Outcome relating specifically to prescription
The court held in favour of the taxpayer.
Although the onus is on the taxpayer to prove that the assessment was not received
in time, the SARS could also not prove that the assessment was delivered prior to
the date of prescription. Per the SARS witness, the assessment was delivered by
hand to the taxpayer's premises, however no acknowledgement of receipt was
obtained by the SARS official. The lack of obtaining an acknowledgment of receipt
by the SARS official was considered sufficient to discharge the taxpayer’s onus to
prove that the assessment was not received in time.
Main principle relating specifically to prescription
The prescription rules are binding even if the reason for not delivering the
assessment in time is as a result of a clerical error.
If it cannot be proved that the assessment was delivered in time, then the rules are
binding regardless of whether the assessment existed prior to the date of
prescription.
37 61 SATC 413 at 418
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ITC 1671 (62 SATC 39) (1999)
Summary of background facts relating specifically to prescription
· The taxpayer submitted its returns in which an allowance was claimed for certain
expenditure in terms of the law at the time. The Commissioner assessed these
returns and issued the relevant assessments.
· The Commissioner afterwards stated that the claiming of the allowances in the
manner done by the taxpayer was under investigation by a special task team
and that any taxpayers involved will not be assessed until the outcome was
obtained from the special task team.
· Given that the Commissioner already assessed this taxpayer, the Commissioner
issued a revised assessment which the Commissioner claimed was the
cancellation of the previous assessments raised in order to asses this taxpayer
when the special task team finalise their investigation.
· When the task team concluded their investigation, the Commissioner raised new
assessments, however the assessments were raised after the expiry of the three
year prescription period.
· The taxpayer contended that the assessments were not valid since the
assessments had prescribed. The Commissioner countered that the
assessments were cancelled and thus he was entitled to raise these
assessments.38
38 62 SATC 39 at 40:41
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Outcome relating specifically to prescription
It was held that since the Commissioner raised the assessment in accordance with
the practice generally prevailing at the time of assessment, the assessment is valid
and cannot be withdrawn.
The prescription period of the return is thus three years from the date of the original
assessment and that the Commissioner may not raise additional assessments after
this period unless the Commissioner can prove there is fraud, misrepresentation or
non-disclosure of material facts present in the tax declaration. The Commissioner
was unable to prove this, thus the assessments were reversed and the original
assessments were confirmed.39
Main principle relating specifically to prescription
Confirmation that as long as the assessment is raised in terms of practice generally
prevailing at the time of assessment and there is no presence of fraud,
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts, a revised assessment may
not be raised after the expiry of three years from the date of assessment.
39 62 SATC 39 at 41:42
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ITC 1730 (64 SATC 391) (2001)
Summary of background facts relating specifically to prescription
· The taxpayer, after submitting its returns, informed the Commissioner in writing
that certain income was not disclosed in the assessed returns.
· The taxpayer also forwarded a cheque based on the additional tax value as
calculated by the taxpayer together with the letter.
· The Commissioner banked the cheque on the taxpayer's account, however
failed to issue the revised assessments. The Commissioner subsequently
assessed the following year's tax submission and paid a refund, which included
the amount received from the taxpayer for the previous years.
· Five years after the Commissioner was notified about the additional income, the
Commissioner raised the additional assessments relating to the said years.
· The taxpayer contested that the three year prescription period had passed while
the Commissioner contended that since there was non-disclosure of information,
the Commissioner was not bound by the three year prescription period and had
thirty years in terms of the Prescription Act, Act 68 of 1969 (the Prescription Act)
to raise the assessment.40
Outcome relating specifically to prescription
It was held that since there was non-disclosure of material facts, the Commissioner
was not bound by the prescription rules as contained in the Act even though the
40 64 SATC 391 at 391:392
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taxpayer notified the Commission about the additional income. The three year
prescription rule per the Act (old rules) and the TAA (new rules) specifically excludes
assessments where there is fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material
facts present and the SARS is thus not bound by the three year rule. The
prescription of the debt will thus be considered under the Prescription Act (old rules)
which allows for 30 years or section 171 of the TAA (new rules) which allows for 15
years. Further these prescription rules also do not require the Commissioner to
issue the assessment within three years of becoming aware of the non-disclosure.
Main principle relating specifically to prescription
When considering the prescription rules per the TAA, the same conclusion will be
drawn (i.e. if there is fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts,
then section 99 does not apply at all to the SARS).
Although it is necessary to require a longer prescription period for when fraud,
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts is present in a case, it is
submitted that there should still be fixed time lines for the SARS to raise the required
assessments once the fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts
is discovered. Subjecting the taxpayer to the 30 year prescription period in terms of
the Prescription Act as per the above case (old rules) or 15 years in terms of section
171 of the TAA (new rules), is considered to be harsh, especially should the taxpayer
voluntary declare the fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts.
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It is thus recommended that specific processes and rules be developed to govern
cases where fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts is present,
especially for when the case relate to a voluntary disclosure.
ITC 1795 (67 SATC 297) (2005)
Summary of background facts relating specifically to prescription
· The taxpayer operates a taxi and is a taxi permit holder.
· The SARS disallowed expenditure not considered in the production of income
relating to the taxpayer’s 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994 years of assessment.
· The taxpayer objected to these assessments on 4 July 1994, which objection
was disallowed by the Commissioner.
· The taxpayer objected again on 20 March 2000 to these assessments and filed
for condonation of late filing. The Commissioner disallowed the objection on the
basis that the taxpayer did not provide any proof of the expenses incurred and
that since the objection was filed almost six years after the assessment date of
the latest assessment the taxpayer was objecting to, the assessments have
prescribed.
· The taxpayer proceeded to file an appeal in which the taxpayer stated that the
Commissioner did not properly exercise his discretion when he disallowed the
expenditure, further the Commissioner did not follow the guidelines as set out in
Interpretation Note 15.41
41 67 SATC 297 at 297:298
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· Interpretation note 15 states that the SARS will consider the following factors
when considering condonation of a late submission:
o The prospects of success on the merits;
o The reasons for the delay;
o The length of the delay; and
o Any other relevant factor.
Outcome relating specifically to prescription
It was held that the taxpayer failed to object to the assessments within the required
period of 30 days. No reasonable grounds were provided by the taxpayer as to why
the delay occurred. Accordingly the Commissioner was correct in his decision not
to re-open the assessments.
Main principle relating specifically to prescription
The main principles addressed in this case was the failure of the taxpayer to provide
adequate reasons for late filing of the objection (i.e. the taxpayer did not show
"exceptional circumstances").
Furthermore reference was made to the fact that employing the service of a tax
consultant does not absolve the taxpayer from his responsibility to comply with the
Act when the taxpayer attempted to shift the blame for untimely objections to the tax
consultant.
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CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd (69 SATC 205) (2007)
Summary of background facts relating specifically to prescription
· The Commissioner raised revised assessments to the taxpayer's 1996, 1997,
1998 and 1998 years of assessment on 3 March 2002 (Original assessments
were issued on 13 March 2000).
· The taxpayer objected to these assessments which the Commissioner
subsequently allowed and new assessments were issued.
· The Commissioner then on 1 July 2004 (more than 3 years after the date of the
original assessments) raised further revised assessments for those the years
which effectively reversed the allowed objections made by the taxpayer.
· The taxpayer contended that the Commissioner was not allowed to issue the
further revised assessments as these assessments had become final when the
objections were allowed by the SARS.42
Outcome relating specifically to prescription
It was held that the purpose of the prescription rules were to achieve finality in
assessments. Cloete JA stated43:
'It seems to me that these competing contentions must be resolved by having regard
to the purpose underlying ss 79(1) and 81(5), which is obviously to achieve finality.
To uphold either of the Commissioner's contentions would undermine that purpose.
It is obviously in the public interest that the Commissioner should collect tax that is
42 CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd (69 SATC 205) para [26] at 206:207
43 Ibid at 217:218
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payable by a taxpayer. But it is also in the public interest that disputes should come
to an end - interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium;and it would be unfair to an honest
taxpayer if the Commissioner were to be allowed to continue to change the basis
upon which the taxpayer were assessed until the Commissioner got it right -
memories fade; witnesses become unavailable; documents are lost. That is why s
79(1) seeks to achieve a balance: it allows the Commissioner three years to collect
the tax, which the legislature regarded as a fair period of time; but it does not protect
a taxpayer guilty of fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure. If either of the
Commissioner's arguments were to be upheld, this balance would be unfairly tilted
against the honest taxpayer.'
Given that the case did not contain fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure, the
Commissioner is precluded from raising new assessments after the three year
period as the original assessments had become final.
Main principle relating specifically to prescription
The principle of finality of assessments was addressed in this case (i.e. the
requirement for assessments to become final in terms of the requirements of the
Act).
ITC 1855 (74 SATC 58) (2010)
Summary of background facts relating specifically to prescription
· The SARS issued an assessment relating to the 2002 year of assessment which
had a date of assessment of 1 June 2004. The taxpayer on 5 June 2006
requested a reduced assessment from the Commissioner on the basis that
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certain expenses qualified as deduction but were not claimed in the returns for
2001 to 2004.
· The SARS, on 4 May 2007 sent a letter headed as "Income Tax: Revised
Assessments for the years of assessment 2001 to 2004”. The letter included
responses to all the objections and questions raised by the taxpayer and
concluded with a revised calculation of the tax loss for the years of assessments.
The letter further stated that the client’s revised assessments would be issued in
due course.
· The SARS contended that the letter sent on 4 May 2007 did not constitute an
assessment and that subsequently the 2002 tax year had prescribed.
· The taxpayer argued that the letter received on 4 May 2007 was a revised
assessment and thus the 2002 assessment had not yet become final.44
Outcome relating specifically to prescription
RD Claasen J held that the letter received on 4 May 2007 indeed constituted an
assessment. RD Claasen J cited Irvin & Johnson (SA) Ltd v CIR 14 SATC 24 at
28945:
'Subjectively, an assessment is an abstraction which has no real existence until it is
published by being expressed in symbols which convey a meaning to others. So
long as it is locked up in the mind of the assessing officer, who is not necessarily the
Commissioner, it cannot be dealt with as required by the Act. Its particulars cannot
be recorded by anyone except the assessing officer; they cannot be filed (see sec
44 Summarised from ITC 1855 (74 SATC 58) at 58:59
45ITC 1855 (74 SATC 58) para [7] at 60
59
67(2)); the Commissioner cannot issue the assessment (see sec 67(8)), nor can he
alter it. It seems, therefore, that in most places in the Act the word "assessment"
does not mean the unexpressed thoughts of the assessing officer, but the written
representation of those thoughts. Again assessment must result in a figure, it is an
"amount" which has to be determined and it is that "amount" or figure which the
Commissioner may "reduce" or "alter" under sec 77(6)'
In terms of the citation, an assessment is the written representation of the
Commissioner, further the assessment must result in an amount. Both these
requirements were met in the letter received from the SARS on 4 May 2007, thus
the letter meets the requirement of an assessment.
This principle was later confirmed by Plasket AJA in the Supreme Court of Appeal.46
Main principle relating specifically to prescription
The meaning of an assessment (i.e. what constitutes an assessment).
Summary of conclusions reached in the various court cases
Based on the treatment in the courts, the following conclusions can be drawn on the
prescription rules:
· It is necessary for assessments to prescribe. Although it is in the public’s interest
that SARS is required to collect all taxes due to the fiscus, it is also in the public’s
interest that assessments become final.47
46 CSARS v South African Custodial Services (Pty) Ltd (2012 (1) SA 522 (SCA)) 74 SATC 61
47CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd (69 SATC 205) at [26] on 217
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· The taxpayer will not enjoy the limitations of the prescription rules as contained
in the TAA when the assessment relates to fraud, misrepresentation or non-
disclosure of material facts.48
· Both the taxpayer and the SARS are bound by the relevant sections of the TAA
(i.e. section 104 and section 99 of the TAA respectively).
When considering the prescription rules against the criteria, it is submitted that the
process is considered to be adequate because:
· The goal of the prescription rules is to achieve finality in assessments and as
stated above, this is in the public’s interest and in terms of the Constitution which
requires that.
· The prescription places a responsibility on the taxpayer to actively monitor its tax
affairs, consider the adequacy of assessments raised by the SARS and ensure
full and accurate disclosure is made during submissions. The objection period is
considerably short and should exceptional circumstances be present, then the
prescription period is not significantly long as well. However three years is
considered to be adequate in the majority of cases to finalise an assessment /
submission.
This restriction thus achieves the intended result that the taxpayer monitor its tax
affairs and address objections in a timely manner.
· The prescription rules also place a responsibility on the SARS to properly and
timeously review submissions and collect tax in an efficient and timely manner.
48 Section 99(2) of the TAA
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· Although one can consider that the rules relating to prescription when there is
fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts present to be quite
harsh, it is understandable in order to deter taxpayers from these activities.
However it is still considered to be good practice for the rules and the TAA to
address the consequences, prescription period and procedural requirements to
follow after discovery of the fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of
material facts. Although the taxpayer is in the wrong, the taxpayer should also
not be required to wait a significantly long period for the SARS to address the
matter and raise the required assessments, especially if the fraud,
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts was brought to the
attention of the SARS through a voluntary disclosure by the taxpayer.
Considering the above goals and intentions of the prescription rules, in each of the
cases, these considerations were the deciding factor. Either the SARS did not
addressing the assessment in an efficient or timely manner or the taxpayer did not
actively monitoring its tax affairs. Even though one matter was identified in the
prescription rules, the matter is not considered to be significant to conclude that the
process is flawed. The matter will be included in the recommendations.
The prescription rules are thus considered to be adequate, fair and constitutional.
Overall conclusion
Extension of submission periods and the prescriptions rules were considered above.
It is submitted that extension of submission period rules is considered to be flawed.
When considering the investigated rules against the Constitutional requirements, it
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is submitted that the processes may restrict the taxpayer’s constitutional rights. The
reasons are as follow:
· The taxpayer’s right to have services provided impartially, fairly, equitably and
without bias – This requirement was compromised since the taxpayer could be
taxed unfairly as stated above.
· The taxpayer’s right to have the SARS be held accountable for incorrect
assessments or processes – This requirement was compromised since the
SARS is not held responsible for ensuring any assessments raised by the SARS
are made free of processing or clerical errors.
· The taxpayer’s right to be provided with timely, accessible and accurate
information – This requirements was compromised by the findings since there
is no requirement for the SARS to issue an accurate assessment which is free
of processing of clerical errors.
4.3 Reasons for assessment
Rule 6 in the rules allows the taxpayer to request reasons for any assessment raised
by the SARS. It also prescribes the period and manner in which the taxpayer may
request reasons and prescribes the manner and period the SARS has to respond
to the request.
When considering whether this rule is flawed or not, it is submitted that there are
two potential issues:
· The SARS providing inadequate reasons; and
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· Unnecessary delays by the SARS to provide the reasons for assessment to the
taxpayer.
What is considered to be adequate reasons?
The question was considered in the following cases:
· ITC 1811 68 SATC 193 (2005); and
· CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117 CC trading as Global Investment (73 SATC
114) (2010)49
ITC 1811 68 SATC 193 (2005)
Summary of background facts relating to the request for reasons
The SARS raised additional assessments on Value-Added Tax (“VAT”) on
6 October 2004. In terms of rules at the time, the taxpayer was entitled to request
the Commissioner to furnish reasons for the assessment and on 3 November 2004
the taxpayer did so.
The Commissioner replied to the taxpayer in a letter dated 8 June 2005 as follows:
· The taxpayer had been informed in December 2004 that adequate reasons had
been provided;
· The letter referred the taxpayer to a myriad of documents which the taxpayer
should use to determine what the reasons for the assessment might be; and
49 2011 (4) SA 551 (SCA)
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· Finally, the letter did not include the legislation, facts and thought process used
by the SARS in order to formulate the additional assessments.
The taxpayer approached the court to compel the SARS to provide the taxpayer
with adequate reasons.
Outcome relating specifically to the request for reasons
It was held that the SARS did not provide the taxpayer with adequate reasons and
the court instructed the SARS to provide the taxpayer with adequate reasons.
The thought process of Judge Jajbhay J:
Jajbhay J proceeded to first consider the jurisdiction of the court on whether the
matter relating to the furnishing of inadequate reasons may be heard by the tax
court. It was confirmed in terms of rule 26(1)(a) of the rules at the time of the case
may be heard in the tax court.50
Jajbhay J then proceeded to consider the factual background and relevant sections
to the Value-Added Tax Act, Act no. 89 of 1991 (“VAT Act”). 51
Jajbhay J then considered the question as to what constitutes adequate reasons.
When considering adequate reasons, Jajbhay J, first referred to Schutz JA in
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries52:
50ITC 1811 68 SATC 193 at 197:198
51 Ibid
52Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries 2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA) at para [40]
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‘…requires the decision maker to explain his decision in a way which will enable a
person aggrieved to say, in effect: "even though I may not agree with it, I now
understand why the decision went against me. I am now in a position to decide
whether that decision has involved an unwarranted finding of fact, or an error of law,
which is worth challenging".
This requires that the decision maker should set out his understanding of the
relevant law, any findings of fact on which his conclusions depend (especially if
those facts have been in dispute) and the reasoning process which led him to those
conclusions.
He should do so in clear and unambiguous language, not in vague generalities or
the formal language of legislation.
The appropriate length of the statement covering such matters will depend upon
considerations such as the nature and importance of the decision, its complexity and
the time available to formulate the statement. Often those factors may suggest a
brief statement of one or two pages only'.53
(Emphasis added)
Based on Jajbhay J citation of Schutz JA it is submitted that the following criteria
have to be met when considering whether the reasons are adequate:
· The understanding of the relevant law should be set out;
· The findings and facts on which the conclusions are based; and
· The reasoning process which lead to the conclusion made.
53 ITC 1811 68 SATC 193 at 200
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Jajbhay J further cited the view promoted by Iain Currie and Jonathan Klaaren54:
‘According to the learned authors 'a single line statement of reasons may quite
adequately explain a straightforward decision with far reaching consequences, while
a decision involving complex assessments of fact and the exercise of considerable
interpretive discretion will take a great deal more explaining, no matter what its
consequences are’.’
Based on Iain Currie and Jonathan Klaaren, it is submitted that when providing
reasons, the detail of reasons to be provided correlates to the complexity of the
issue at hand. Should the issue at hand be of low complexity and can be sufficiently
explained without preparing a detailed write-up on the matter, then it will be
considered to be adequate reasons.
This further implies that implementing set requirements for the length or content of
response to a request for reasons by the SARS will not be appropriate.
Lastly Jajbhay J also cited Kirk-Cohen J55:
‘The following dictum of Kirk-Cohen J in the Réan case, referred to above, is also
relevant:
'On the one hand it is not necessary for an administrative body to spoon feed
an aggrieved party seeking reasons; on the other hand the administrative
body cannot expect an aggrieved party to seek justification for the reasons
54 Citation in ITC 1811 68 SATC 193 at 201 from Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001)
para 5.12
55 Citation in ITC 1811 68 SATC 193 at 202
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from a myriad of documents where such reasons cannot reasonably be
determined.'  Réan International, supra, 927H.’
Here reference is again made to the level of detail required when responding. Based
on Kirk-Cohen J’s statement it can be submitted that the reason to be provided to
the taxpayer is not required to be a full in depth analysis of the issue at hand, nor
should it be an information dump (i.e. the SARS cannot provide a stack of
documents with no logical order or clear thought process and expect the taxpayer
to reasonably determine the reasons for assessment).
Based on the above, it is submitted that:
· The adequacy of the reasons to be provided by the SARS have to be provided
in a clear and unambiguous manner in order to allow the taxpayer to be in a
position to reasonably understand the reasons for raising an assessment by the
SARS; and
· The term “reasonably understand” does not mean a full in depth analysis of the
issue but rather sufficient information for the taxpayer to identify the relevant
legislation invoked, the facts on which the legislation was applied and the thought
process on how the SARS came to that conclusion.
Returning to the case Jajbhay J concluded that the SARS failed the various tests to
determine whether adequate reasons have been provided. 56  In terms of the
background facts, the significant reason why the SARS failed was due to the manner
in which the SARS provided reasons to the taxpayer. The taxpayer was referred, in
56ITC 1811 68 SATC 193 at 199:203
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the letter, to a myriad of documents which the taxpayer should use to determine
what the reasons for the assessment might be. This does not constitute adequate
reasons and was confirmed by Jajbhay J:
‘It follows that it is not incumbent on the applicant or the court to sift through the list
of letters, many of which, I was informed had annexures which are not now attached,
in search of the respondent's findings of fact, understanding of the law, and
reasoning towards the result.
The approach of the respondent to the applicant leaves the court in the position
where, at best for the respondent, it must conclude that there might be adequate
reasons in the letters but because it has not been proved to be the case, the
application must succeed.’57
(Emphasis added)
Based on the above, it can be concluded that Jajbhay J in ITC 1811 adequately
applied the various tests, the correct verdict was reached and the court’s
interpretation of adequate reasons becomes quite clear.
CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117 CC trading as Global Investment (73 SATC 114)
(2010)
Background facts relating specifically to the request for reasons:
The taxpayer was issued with a “letter of assessment” and additional assessments
relating to VAT. In responses to the assessment, the taxpayer requested reasons
57 ITC 1811 68 SATC 193 at 204:205
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from the SARS for the assessment raised. The request however was delivered to
the SARS in two letters which contained 97 detailed questions on the assessments
raised by the SARS.
The SARS was reluctant to indulge the taxpayer’s detailed request for reasons and
responded briefly on each of the tax types taxed while referring the taxpayer back
to the “letter of assessment which contained the reasoning applied by the SARS
when raising the assessment.58
Outcome relating specifically to the request for reasons
It was held that the SARS had provided the taxpayer with adequate reasons.
Maya JA first considered the reference made to the Phambili test59 in the tax court
case relating to this case. Maya JA did not agree with the tax court finding that the
reasons provided by the SARS did not meet the Phambili test and stated the
following:
‘As appears from the above-quoted dictum in Phambili, the test envisages that the
decision in issue may involve 'an unwarranted finding of fact, or an error of law,
which is worth challenging' and merely requires the decision-maker to explain why
he decided the way he did to enable the requester of reasons to launch his
challenge. It is only when the objection itself is adjudicated under judicial review that
the PAJA test which the respondent wants imposed comes into play. The question
now is simply whether the respondent has sufficiently been furnished with the
58 CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117 CC trading as Global Investment (73 SATC 114) at 115:116
59 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries 2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA)
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Commissioner's actual reasons for the assessments to enable it to formulate its
objection thereto.’60
(Emphasis added)
Given that the taxpayer was still contesting the adequacy of the request for reasons,
Maya JA confirmed that the level of detail required to be provided by the SARS
during a request of such a nature is to only provide the taxpayer actual reasons for
the assessment made in order for the taxpayer to formulate an objection thereto.
Maya JA agreed with the SARS that the reasons provided and the referral to the
“letter of assessment” was considered to be adequate reasons as stated below by
Maya JA in the judgement61:
‘The letter of assessment, which the respondent was urged to read in conjunction
with the letter of findings, stated in plain terms that the respondent was being
assessed for income tax, employees' tax and VAT. It explained the reasons for the
imposition of employees' tax, VAT and the ancillary penalties and interest.
It explained further why no revised assessments would be issued in respect of
income tax.’
(Emphasis added)
The letter of assessment thus met the above requirements as previously set namely
the relevant law, the findings and facts on which the conclusions are based and the
reasoning process which lead to the conclusion made.
60 CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117 CC t/a Global Investments 73 SATC 114 at para [14] on 121
61 Ibid at para [17] on121
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Adequacy of the process
Given the analysis of the process and court cases where the process was contested,
it is submitted that the process is considered to be “adequate”.
The reasons why the process is considered to be adequate is that, although there
is no specific requirements that the SARS have to comply with when providing
reasons for an assessment (i.e. the minimum information that have to be contained
in the response by the SARS), a precedent has been set by the courts as to what is
considered to be adequate reasons with various tests.
When assessing the process against the constitutional requirements it is submitted
that the process is constitutional. The reasons were:
· The taxpayer’s right to have services provided impartially, fairly, equitably and
without bias – There are multiple tests to determine whether the reasons
provided by the SARS are adequate. The process is thus operating effectively
and allows the taxpayer to a services which is fair and without bias.
· The taxpayer’s right to have the SARS be held accountable for incorrect
assessments or processes – Not applicable based on the discussions above.
· The taxpayer’s right to be provided with timely, accessible and accurate
information – Given the set timelines put in place and the requirements as set
down in case law of what is adequate reasons, the process allows the taxpayer
access to the timely and accurate information when objecting to an assessment.
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For this reason the process is adequate, though it is recommended that a provision
be made as to certain minimum requirements which should be met by the SARS
when providing reasons for a revised assessment issued by the SARS. These
requirements could include:
· The understanding of the relevant law should be set out;
· The findings and facts on which the conclusions are based; and
· The reasoning process which lead to the conclusion made.
Inclusion of the above in the rules, will not only provide a clear guideline as to what
is considered to be adequate reasons but also act as a deterrent for taxpayers to
use this provision as a delay tactic.
4.4 Appeal against rejection of an objection
Rule 10 allows the taxpayer to appeal against a disallowed objection. Rule 10
contains various provisions to adhere to when appealing to an objection.
These provisions include the period to appeal, the form and manner of appealing,
the provision relating to the introduction of new information (Rule 10 (2)), limitations
imposed on the introduction of new information (Rule 10(3)) and the response times
required to be met by the SARS.
The main focus and potentially contentious issue when appealing against a
disallowed objection is the introduction of new grounds on which the taxpayer relies.
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 Rule 10(1)(c) states the following:
(c)  specify in detail-
(i) in respect of which grounds of the objection referred to in rule 7 the
taxpayer is appealing;
(ii)  the grounds for disputing the basis of the decision to disallow the
objection referred to in section 106(5); and
(iii)  any new ground on which the taxpayer is appealing;
Rule 10(3) however limits the application of rule 10(1)(c)(iii) as follow:
The taxpayer may not appeal on a ground that constitutes a new objection against
a part or amount of the disputed assessment not objected to under rule 7.
Based on the above, a taxpayer may introduce new grounds for appealing as long
as the new ground relates to an amount or part of the assessment which was
originally objected to.
For example if a taxpayer considered certain income to be exempt income and has
not included the income as gross income in his tax declaration. The taxpayer also
did not claim any expenditure incurred in the production of this exempt income. The
SARS raised an additional assessment taxing the income, however no adjustment
is made to the unclaimed expenditure.
The taxpayer objects to the taxing of the income, but not to the expenditure not
adjusted for. Should the taxpayer fail in the objection (i.e. the SARS disallows the
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objection), the taxpayer will also not be able to object to the unadjusted expenditure
as it will constitute a new ground for appeal.
The unadjusted expenditure should have been considered and included in the
original objection to be considered for the appeal in terms of rule 10(3).
The above example exposes the contentious issue with regard to this rule. In some
instances, the deductibility of expenditure is determined by the manner in which the
income relating to those expenses are taxed (i.e. expenses incurred in the
production of exempt income). The rules regarding raising of assessments places
no requirement on the SARS to consider the effects that the change made by the
SARS in the additional assessment has on the rest of the tax return.  The SARS is
thus allowed to look at certain parts of the tax submission in isolation.
It is submitted that a taxpayer (even though it is good practice to prepare a complete
and accurate objection on the full assessment), will generally focus on the change
made by the SARS and the reasons for raising an additional assessment instead of
the further implications of the change on the rest of the tax submission.
It is further submitted that the SARS, knowing this provisions limits new grounds,
may be encouraged to only consider parts of the return submissions in isolation,
thus abusing the favourable position the SARS has as a result of this provision.
The result is that a taxpayer may be unfairly taxed and, because of a procedural
matter, have no remedy.
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Introduction of new grounds for objection was considered in the following court
cases:
· Computek (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 75 SATC 104 (2012)62; and
· ITC 1843 72 SATC 229 (2010)
Computek (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 75 SATC 104 (2012)
Background facts relating specifically to the appeal process
The SARS conducted a VAT audit on the taxpayer and raised assessments for VAT
(R 1 246 177.57), additional tax (R 2 492 355.06), penalties (R 124 617.75) and
interest (R 177 226.90). The taxpayer objected to the assessments and when
completing the specified form indicated that the taxpayer was objecting to the
additional tax, penalties, interest charged and procedural matters. It should be noted
that taxpayer did not specifically object to the capital VAT amount.
The SARS disallowed the objection indicating that no objection was made to the
VAT amount and thus the SARS had correctly applied the sections of the relevant
Acts to raise the additional tax, penalties and interest.
The taxpayer, more than three years later, filed a notice of appeal to the SARS
where the taxpayer appealed against the disallowed objection. Included in the
grounds for appeal, the taxpayer for the first time stated that the SARS included
62 2012 (830/2011) ZASCA 178
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turnover of a related entity and thus the capital VAT amount was incorrectly
calculated.63
Outcome
The court held that when the taxpayer challenged the capital amount for the first
time during the notice of appeal, the taxpayer effectively raised a new objection
which was not previously objected to and rule 10(3) thus applies which ultimately
will disallow the taxpayer from raising the new ground for appeal.
Ponnan JA made in his judgement the following key remarks:
Ponnan JA first referred to Corbett JA statement64:
'Section 81(3) of the Act provides that every objection shall be in writing and shall
specify in detail the grounds upon which it is made. And in terms of s 83(7)(b) the
appellant in an appeal against the disallowance of his objection is limited to the
grounds stated in his notice of objection. This limitation is for the benefit of the
Commissioner and may be waived by him . . .
It is naturally important that the provisions of s 83(7)(b) be adhered to, for otherwise
the Commissioner may be prejudiced by an appellant shifting the grounds of his
objection to the assessment in issue. At the same time I do not think that in
interpreting and applying s 83(7)(b) the court should be unduly technical or rigid in
its approach.
63 Computek (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 75 SATC 104 at 104:105
64 Ibid at para [11] on 111
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It should look at the substance of the objection and the issue as to whether it covers
the point which the appellant wishes to advance on appeal must be adjudged on the
particular facts of the case.'
(Emphasis added)
Ponnan JA stated at page 111 that although the same principle of introducing new
grounds for objection is not contained in the VAT Act, there is no reason why this
principle should not apply with equal force to an objection and appeal in terms of the
VAT Act.
Ponnan JA proceeded to state Cloete JA’s explanation of the rationale for inclusion
of this principle (i.e. to bring finality to an objection and not allowing new grounds
which constitutes new objections to be included when appealing to a disallowed
objection). Refer to discussion in the CSARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd
case in 4.1.2.
Ponnan JA, then came to the conclusion:
‘It follows that not having raised an objection to the capital assessment in its notice
of objection, the taxpayer was precluded from raising it on appeal before the tax
court. That that must be so finds support in rule 6(3)(a)…
…Thus when the taxpayer challenged the capital amount for the first time in its rule
11 statement, it effectively raised a 'new objection' directed at an individual assessed
amount that had not previously been objected to.’65
65 Ibid at para [12] on 112
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(Emphasis added)
Based on the above the appeal was dismissed.
When considering the reason why the appeal was dismissed, it is submitted that the
appeal was disallowed for the wrong reasons. The taxpayer contested that the
penalty was excessive in the original objection.
At the time, the penalty was calculated using section 76(1)(b) of  the  Act  which
stated:
1) A taxpayer shall be required to pay in addition to the tax chargeable in
respect of his taxable income—
b) if he omits from his return any amount which ought to have been
included therein, an amount equal to twice the difference between
the tax as calculated in respect of the taxable income returned by him
and the tax properly chargeable in respect of his taxable income as
determined after including the amount omitted;
This section requires the SARS to charge a penalty of twice the difference between
the tax as calculated by the taxpayer and the amount of tax properly chargeable as
determined by the Commissioner. Given that the penalty is purely based on the
incorrect amount taxed, it is submitted that the penalty was closely linked to the
incorrect tax charged and thus when objecting to the penalty, the taxpayer
effectively objected to the capital amount.
It is thus submitted that the appeal should not have been dismissed based on the
introduction of new grounds.
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However when considering the full facts in the case, it is submitted that the correct
decision was made to dismiss the appeal. The taxpayer made numerous procedural
errors in its objection namely:
· Based on the case write up, it appears that the taxpayer did not provide
complete and accurate grounds for objection. The grounds focused on the
quantum of the penalty, unfair imposition of the penalty and unfair tax procedural
matters and not on the incorrect VAT assessment made by the SARS.
· When disallowing the objection, the SARS indicated no objection was made to
the VAT amount, to which the taxpayer’s accountant stated that they are in
agreement with. Still no objection was made to the VAT amount at this point in
the dispute. It is submitted that this is one of the main points on which the appeal
failed.
· The objection was disallowed on 28 July 2004 and the taxpayer only filed a
notice of appeal on 22 January 2007 which is almost 29 months after the
taxpayer was notified that the objection was disallowed. This period is a
significantly long period and based on the case write up, there were no
exceptional circumstances present.
It is submitted the above procedural errors could have been enough to dismiss the
appeal.
Based on the above, the taxpayer was eventually unfairly taxed, but it could also be
put down to the taxpayer’s own lack of procedural accuracy and ensuring than an
accurate objection was submitted to the SARS. The taxpayer could have requested
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reasons for the additional VAT and based on the reasons investigated why the
assessment was raised. Had the taxpayer done a diligent assessment of the
reasons, it is submitted that the taxpayer would have discovered the reason for the
additional VAT charged by the SARS and prepared an accurate and complete
objection.
When considering if the process is flawed based on the above, the answer is no.
The reasons for this conclusion is as follow:
· Although, as submitted above, the link between the penalty and the capital
amount was not sufficiently considered, the process of not allowing new
grounds were adequately applied.
· This case is riddled with a lack of procedural accuracy by the taxpayer and the
taxpayer was afforded numerous opportunities to object to the VAT
assessment which it did not. The first time the taxpayer made a tangible
objection focused at the VAT assessment was during the appeal stage.
· On the face value of the facts, it is thus understandable that the objection to
the VAT assessment during the appeal stage was interpreted as a new ground.
· The process thus operated effectively, except for a technical aspect which is
unique to the case.
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ITC 1843 72 SATC 229 (2010)
Background facts
In this case the SARS raised additional assessment for VAT. The SARS explained
the reasons for raising these assessment in various letters to the taxpayer. The
taxpayer in response objected to these assessments. The SARS disallowed the
objection but in the reasons for disallowing the objection the SARS changed its
reasons for assessment (i.e. introduced new grounds for assessment).
The taxpayer appealed against the disallowed objection and specifically to the
inclusion of new grounds for assessment.66
Outcome
The court held in favour of the SARS allowing the new grounds for assessment to
be presented by the SARS since this was done prior to the litigation stage and/or
finalisation of the dispute.
The difference between the two cases is that in the Computec case, the taxpayer
wanted to include a new objection during the appeal stage (i.e. the taxpayer had the
opportunity to object to the capital VAT amount when filing the objection, however
during that time did not consider whether the SARS was correct in raising the VAT).
In the ITC 1843 case, the SARS changed its reasons for assessment. Although new
reasons were provided, the taxpayer was not treated unfairly. The taxpayer was still
66 ITC 1843 (72 SATC 229) at 231:233
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allowed to request reasons for these new grounds, and then object to the
assessment raised by the SARS if possible.
Adequacy of the appeal process
Considering the above, the conclusion reached on this process is that the process
is adequate. The reasons for concluding that the process adequate are:
· If the taxpayer was provided with adequate reasons, it is expected that the
taxpayer should be able to understand the reasons for assessment by the
SARS. Should the taxpayer not agree with the reasons, the taxpayer may
object to the assessment.
· Should the taxpayer decide to only object to a portion of the assessment, then
it is assumed that the taxpayer agrees with the rest of the assessment.
The taxpayer files the return. If the SARS raise an additional assessment, the
taxpayer may request reasons and has to consider the reasons before deciding to
object. It is reasonable to expect the taxpayer to investigate the full reasons for the
assessment and not only a specific portion. Thus it is not reasonable for the taxpayer
to subsequently object during the appeal stage to the portion of the assessment not
previously objected to. An appeal is to challenge the reason for disallowing an
objection. The SARS will thus assess the objection as received and either allow or
disallow it. If the objection is not complete, then the SARS cannot give an opinion
on something that is not there. The same can be said when appealing against an
objection. Should appeal not relate to the objection, then one cannot appeal against
it.
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The problem is that, although the restriction can be considered to be adequate, it
can result in a taxpayer being unfairly taxed. The prospects of a taxpayer being
unfairly tax is not considered to compromise the rule since it is submitted that the
only reason why the taxpayer is unfairly taxed is as a result of the taxpayer’s doing
(i.e. the taxpayer not ensuring that all elements per the reasons for assessment
were considered and investigated prior to the objection). The SARS can thus not be
bound to ever changing objections as a result of the taxpayer’s inability to assess
all the reasons for assessment and prepare a complete objection.
When assessing the process against the constitutional requirements it is submitted
that the process is constitutional. The reasons are:
· The taxpayer’s right to have services provided impartially, fairly, equitably and
without bias – although it was submitted that the taxpayer may be taxed unfairly
as a result of the limitation on providing new grounds for objection during the
appeal stage, it was also submitted that for the taxpayer to introduce new
grounds for appeal, it means that the taxpayer did not prepare an accurate and
complete objection. This rule was intended to bring fairness to the appeal
process (i.e. preventing the taxpayer from shifting grounds to reach a favourable
position) and it is submitted that the rule do just that. The rules is thus
considered to be constitutional.
· The taxpayer’s right to have the SARS be held accountable for incorrect
assessments or processes – Not applicable to this section.
· The taxpayer’s right to be provided with timely, accessible and accurate
information – Not applicable to this section.
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION
This study set out to determine whether the dispute process stands up to the
Constitutional requirements as set out in section 195 of the Constitution. The study,
in chapter two, firstly summarised the dispute process. The dispute process was
split up into four stages namely:
Assessment and discovery stage – This stage mainly deals with the request for
reasons and extension of time periods processes.
Objection stage – This stage deals with the rules and processes surrounding the
lodging of an objection to the SARS.
Appeal stage – This stage deals with the processes surrounding the lodgement of
an appeal on a disallowed objection.
Litigation stage – This stage deals with the rules and processes surrounding
further litigation in the tax board, tax court and higher courts as well as the ADR
process. This stage was excluded from the study.
In chapter three, each of the remaining stages were assessed to identify the
significant processes based on number of times the process was contested in the
courts, whether the process was critical in the dispute process or if there was a
potential for abuse.
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The following processes were submitted to be significant processes:
· Prescribed form and manner, objection against an assessment and extension
of time periods;
· Reasons for assessment;
· Appeal against rejection of an objection.
In chapter four each of these significant processes were analysed to determine
whether each process met one of the following classifications:
Adequate:  The process is considered to work effectively and unbiased.
Flawed: The process is considered to either not work effectively or was biased
towards one of the parties to the dispute process or considered to
restrict the taxpayer’s constitutional rights.
Each significant process was also considered against the following Constitutional
requirements:
· The taxpayer’s right to have services provided impartially, fairly, equitably and
without bias.67
· The taxpayer’s right to have the SARS be held accountable for incorrect
assessments or processes.68
67 Section 195 (d) of The Constitution
68 Ibid section 195 (f)
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· The taxpayer’s right to be provided with timely, accessible and accurate
information.69
Based on the analysis the following conclusions were reached:
1. Lodging an objection within 30 days of assessment in the prescribed from
and the concept of “exceptional circumstances”
It is submitted that this process is flawed is due to the process not allowing for
processing or clerical errors made by the SARS which also lead to the
conclusion that the process may restrict the taxpayers constitutional rights.
The process has the potential to be abused by the SARS to prevent a taxpayer
from objecting to an assessment even though there was no fault from the
taxpayer’s side other than possibly identifying the error too late.
It was recommended that some form of responsibility be placed on the SARS to
issue clerically accurate assessments and be responsible for errors on system
generated assessments.
2. Prescription period of three years for returns
The process was considered to be adequate and constitutional. The intention of
the prescription rules is to obtain finality in disputes. The other intention of these
rules is to ensure the taxpayer monitors its tax affairs and for the SARS to
assess and collect tax in an efficient and timely manner. Both these intentions
69 Ibid section 195 (g)
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are achieved through the prescription rules which relate to both the taxpayer
and SARS.
It was however noted that the there are no set rules when there is evidence of
fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts in the case and it
was recommended that set rules be included in the rules and the TAA to address
the consequences, prescription period and processes surrounding cases where
fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts is present.
3. Reasons for assessment
Based on the assessment of the process, how the process was treated in courts
and the outcomes of the processes in the courts, the request for reasons
process was considered to be adequate and constitutional. Clear guidelines and
requirements have been set in the courts as to what is considered to be
adequate reasons and it have been so applied when considering whether the
reasons provided by the SARS are adequate.
It is however recommended that the process adopt minimum requirements
which the SARS have to adhere to during a request for reasons.
4. Appeal against rejection of an objection
This process was considered to be adequate and constitutional. It was
submitted that there is potential that a taxpayer may be unfairly taxed if not
allowed to present new grounds for objection. However the appeal stage is fairly
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late in the dispute process and it is expected that the taxpayer should have
consider the full assessment prior to objecting.
As a result the restriction placed on the taxpayer and SARS in this section is
valid and required in order for a dispute to be finalised.
Overall conclusion on the dispute process
Based on the assessment above and the scope of the research the process is
considered to be adequate with matters.  Some contentious issues have been
identified but the process as whole can still be considered to be adequate provided
that the taxpayer is diligent in his / her tax affairs and has some knowledge of this
process and the relevant tax Acts.
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